bk99.de entertain the web since 1997

bk99.de
KrebsOnSecurity · IT securityCurated

The scrap value of a hacked PC

Summary

Brian Krebs visualises how criminals turn almost every part of a compromised computer, its identity and its network connection into money. The graphic updated an earlier piece Krebs did for the Washington Post. The new version added ransomware as a way of cashing in.

Ideas

  • A computer remains economically valuable to attackers even without online banking.
  • Computing power and bandwidth can be rented out for spam, click fraud and attacks.
  • Stored accounts enable identity theft and the takeover of further services.
  • Ransomware turns local data directly into a means of extortion.
  • Social reputation has a resale value of its own.
  • Criminal markets break compromised systems down into resources that are traded separately.

Insights

  • Low personal data value does not mean low value to an attacker.
  • Cybercrime scales by marketing technical resources in a division of labour.
  • Defence starts with a realistic model of the adversary’s incentives.

Quotes

  • Nearly every aspect of a hacked computer and a user’s online life can be commoditized. – Brian Krebs

Habits

  • Krebs translates the abstract underground economy into an understandable diagram for everyday users.

Facts

  • Hijacked social media profiles were also listed as tradable assets.

References

Critique

  • The graphic simplifies prices and roles in a criminal market that is constantly changing.
  • Specific ways of cashing in from 2012 do not fully match today’s threat landscape.

Remarks

  • The argument still refutes the sentence: there is nothing to get from me.
  • Cloud accounts and session tokens would expand a current version considerably.

Recommendations

  • Protect even seemingly unimportant devices consistently.
  • Separate accounts, sessions and administrative rights according to their damage potential.
  • Explain security measures in terms of concrete attacker incentives.

Read the original article

Search the Web Archive

KrebsOnSecurity · 2010

Stuxnet: The attack does not end at the Windows PC

Using early Stuxnet analyses, Brian Krebs shows how several Windows vulnerabilities, stolen signatures and PLC manipulation made a targeted attack on industrial plants possible. Stuxnet used at least four Windows vulnerabilities that were unknown at the time. Microsoft closed the printer sharing vulnerability with MS10-061.

KrebsOnSecurity · 2025

6.3 Tbit/s: What came after Mirai

Brian Krebs examines a short 6.3 Tbit/s attack and links it to Aisuru, compromised IoT devices and a publicly rented DDoS service. The attack reached more than 6.3 Tbit/s. Google measured around 585 million packets per second.

KrebsOnSecurity · 2024

BlackCat: Ransom does not buy trust

Using the Change Healthcare case, Brian Krebs shows how a presumed multi-million payment, a cheated partner and remaining data undermine every promise of deletion. An attributed address received around 22 million dollars on 1 March. An affiliate continued to claim it held four terabytes of stolen data.